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Rethinking "Original Intent"
David B. Lyons
Editor's note: This article is derived from the author'spaper
"Basic Rights and Constitutional Interpretation,"presented in
April at the Georgia State Conference on Human Freedom and
forthcoming in Social Theory and Practice.

I
Although Dred Scott v. Sandford1 is one of the Supreme
Court's most controversial decisions, it is not often taught
or read. But its approach to constitutional interpretation is
by no means outdated, and its historical importance has
not diminished. So it seems a good example to consider.
Dred Scott was owned as a slave in Missouri by Dr.
John Emerson. In 1833 Emerson took Scott with him when
he moved, first to the free state of Illinois, later to the free
part of the Louisiana Territory. After five years they
returned to Missouri, Scott meanwhile having married
Harriet Robinson, also a slave, and Emerson having
married Irene Sanford.
After Emerson died, in 1843, Scott tried to purchase
his family's 2 freedom from Emerson's widow, but she
refused the offer. Missouri courts held that slaves were
emancipated if they had been taken to live in states or
territories that forbade slavery, as the Scotts had been, so
in 1846 the Scotts began to seek their freedom through
the courts.
A decision for them was rendered in 1850, but Irene
Emerson appealed. In 1852 the Missouri Supreme Court
renounced its own precedents and reversed the lower court
decision. Scott then sued in federal court but received a
negative verdict in 1854. His appeal came before the U.S.
Supreme Court during a period of increasing, sometimes
violent, conflict over the spread of slavery.
Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court had two
principal parts. Declaring that Congress lacked authority to
prohibit slavery, the Court opened vast territories to its
expansion. Before reaching out to decide that issue, the
Court also held that under the Constitution AfricanAmericans "had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect." As most rights recognized by the Constitution
are not limited to citizens, Taney's assertion meant that

African-Americans, free or enslaved, were not even
people. It was not an implausible reading of the law. I shall
focus on that aspect of Taney's opinion.
Although the Declaration of Independence said that
"all men are created equal" and have "unalienable rights,"
that spirit did not dominate the Constitution of 1789, even
after the Bill of Rights was added. The Constitution
secured the slave trade for some years, extended slave law
into free states to retrieve alleged fugitives, and enhanced
slave state representation considerably. Nor was that an
isolated deviation from an institutionalized commitment to
equality and human rights. To mention only the most
obvious examples: without constitutional impediment, the
states denied women basic rights, and national policy
toward Native Americans amounted to eviction and
eradication.
So Taney's assertion that under the Constitution
African-Americans "had no rights which the white man
was bound to respect" was credible.
II
In the Scotts' Missouri suits, the defendant was Irene
Emerson. In Dred Scott's federal suit, the defendant was
her brother, John Sanford, to whom the Scotts had
presumably been sold. As Sanford resided in New York,
Scott sued under the Constitution's "diversity" clause,
which gives federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving
citizens of different states.
Sanford responded by challenging the court's jurisdiction. He argued that Scott "was not a citizen of the State of
Missouri .... being a negro of African descent, whose
ancestors were of pure African blood, and were brought
into this country and sold as slaves." The lower court
rejected that argument, treating residence and the capacity
to own property as sufficient for citizenship. But the
Supreme Court accepted Sanford's argument, holding that
federal courts could not hear Scott's complaint because an
African-American could not be a citizen.
Taney drew a distinction between citizenship that a
state can confer and citizenship under the Constitution.
Otherwise the Constitution would guarantee to African-

Americans who were citizens of some state all the "privileges and immunities" of white men in slave states. Those
states would not have agreed to allow free AfricanAmericans "the full liberty of speech in public and in
private upon all subjects upon which [the state's] own
citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon
political affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they
went. And all of this would be done in the face of the
subject race of the same color, both free and slaves, and
inevitably producing discontent and insubordination
among them, and endangering the peace and safety of the
state." That specter haunted Taney.

III
Legal practice gave some support to Taney's position.
Some states restricted African-Americans more than their
own citizens. Judicial tolerance of those practices suggested
that African-Americans were not counted as citizens under
the privileges and immunities clause. If, as seems plausible,
identical criteria determine citizenship under the diversity
clause, then African-Americans could not be parties in
diversity cases.
On the other hand, it seemed necessary to recognize
degrees of federal citizenship. White women, children, and
men without property were citizens with fewer rights than
propertied white men. African-Americans might similarly
qualify for citizenship even though they too enjoyed fewer
rights. And the Court had already shown that citizenship
under one clause could be different from citizenship under
another, by according corporations rights under the
diversity clause while denying them citizenship under the
privileges and immunities clause)
Taney appealed to original intent. Consider his
reading of the privileges and immunities clause, which says,
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."' He
denied that "the Citizens of each State" refers to those who
are recognized as citizens of the several states by those
states. Taney rejected the most natural reading of the
provision because, he argued, the founders regarded
African-Americans "as a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who.., had no rights or privileges but such as
those who held the power and the Government might
choose to give them." He claimed that African-Americans
"had for more than a century before been regarded as
beings.., so far inferior, that they had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit....

This portraitof Dred Scott was published in 1857.
This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the
civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an
axiom in morals as well as politics, which no one thought
of disputing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men in
every grade and position in society daily and habitually
acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters
of public concern, without doubting for a moment the
correctness of this opinion." Taney's reasoning assumed
that original intent determined the meaning of the
constitutional text.
One need not minimize the depth or prevalence of
racism during the revolutionary period to regard the
picture that he drew as exaggerated. But Taney's factual
claims were more extreme than his argument required. All
he needed to show was that most of those who gave us the
Constitution meant to exclude African-Americans from
constitutional guarantees.
But his argument was implausible. He claimed that the
law and opinion of 1789 precluded any relevant distinction
between free and enslaved African-Americans. He cited
the slave trade, constitutional support for slavery, and
racist state laws as if they somehow proved the point. And

he simply ignored antislavery sentiment in the revolutionary period.
I shall not belabor those criticisms, for I want to
suggest that the original intent approach, as conceived by
both Taney and its current champions, involves fundamental difficulties, but that the idea can be reconstructed to
accord with respected judicial practice.

IV
Theorists of original intent call on judges to follow the
intentions that some people had some time ago. All
appreciate that we can lack relevant historical information.
My misgivings go deeper.'
As a theory of text meaning, the criterion is implausible. The words we use have meanings determined by
linguistic conventions, and the corresponding public
meaning of a text that we produce by speaking or writing
can accordingly differ from what we had in mind. Someone
who wants to interpret the Constitution primarily by
reference to what some people once had in mind needs to
explain why.
Furthermore, the idea is ambiguous. We frequently
cannot follow original intent until we first determine
whose intentions count. In a constitutional context,
framers' intent is usually meant, but that seems arbitrary.
Why should we follow the intentions of those who drafted a
law instead of those who made it law? If the intentions of
the framers differed from the intentions of the ratifiers, we
wouldn't be able to follow both, and we would need good
reason to follow one instead of the other. The bare notion
of original intent does not tell us whose intentions should
be followed.
Any serious attempt to follow original intent must also
determine which states of mind to count. Some theorists
assume that we should be guided only by specific applications that the founders contemplated, but that too seems
arbitrary. One who favors a new piece of law most likely
intends it to solve some problem or achieve some other
end. The point becomes important when such a general
intent is frustrated by specific intended applications.
Here is an example. Raoul Berger 6 objects to the
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.7 He argues
that the fourteenth amendment did not outlaw racial
segregation in public schools, because its originators had
no such intention. Berger agrees, however, that the
amendment was intended to secure basic civil rights for
African-Americans. Now, it is arguable that the Supreme

Court in Plessy v. Ferguson' held, in effect, that those two
intentions were compatible, but that when deciding Brown
the Court finally acknowledged that equal protection could
not be secured while the government officially sanctioned
racism.
It is said that courts should follow original intent so as
to implement the will of those who made the law. But that
begs the question. That courts have a duty to implement
what has been ratified into law does not imply that some
further, private intent takes priority over the public
meaning of the ratified text.
Some want judges to follow original intent so as to
keep them from making "value choices."9 Those theorists
assume that following original intent involves a purely
factual, value-free inquiry into what was going on in some
persons' minds at a certain past time. They equate lawmaking with "value choices," or in other words with the
exercise of moral or political judgment, and assume that
such judgment need not be exercised in the process of legal
interpretation. Those assumptions seem false.
To see that, we must ignore the fact that the
Constitution has already been subjected to judicial
interpretation, and that courts commonly rely on interpretive precedent." We can then observe that application of
the just compensation clause, for example, fundamentally
requires a court to identify criteria of justice in compensation for private property that is taken for public use. It is
difficult to see how that can be done-how the Constitution, which mandates "just compensation," can strictly be
followed-without providing reasons for regarding some
conception of compensatory justice as superior to others.
I believe such judgments can rationally be defended,
but they would presumably count as "value choices"
nonetheless.

V
As it is usually conceived by theorists and applied in some
opinions, original intent is burdened by fundamental
difficulties, with no prospect of solution. But the standard
theory does not square with standard arguments referring
to original intent. A purely historical claim about the
founders' intentions assumes that there was a consensus on
the point at issue. But that essential element is almost
always missing from original intent arguments, even
though we generally have good reason to suppose that the
various founders had differing intentions. Such arguments
rarely try to show, for example, that a given intention

Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North in 1987
regarding a particular aspect of the Constitution was in fact
shared by a supporting majority within the Constitutional
Convention or by a supporting supermajority within a
proposing Congress or among the ratifying states.
There are two possible explanations for that gap
between standard theory and standard practice. Either
references to original intent have the character described
by the theory but are frequently unsubstantiated or they
must be understood differently. I suggest the latter.
Original intent arguments often cite a piece of
reasoning by respected figures, such as Madison or Hamilton.1 Such slim grounds might be adequate if the argument is not meant to show that there was probably an
intentional consensus among the founders-that is, if the
argument has a slightly different character. What the
standard arguments often seem to do, instead, is to recall a
political insight that offers a plausible justifying rationale
for the constitutional arrangement in question." Given a
rationale, we can often decide the interpretive issue.

Consider a recent case. The Ethics in Government
Act of 197813 provides for judicial appointment of an
independent counsel to investigate misconduct in the
executive branch of the federal government. While under
investigation by a counsel so appointed, Lt. Col. Oliver
North challenged that provision as a violation of the
constitutionally mandated "separation of powers."
That is a plausible argument. The first three articles of
the Constitution divide up governmental authority. As
only the president is specifically instructed to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed," it is reasonable to
infer that enforcement of federal law is an executive
branch responsibility. It then seems plausible to suppose
that federal prosecutors should be appointed by and
answerable to the president, which would rule out independent counsels.
But the constitutional challenge is problematic, for
the constitutional separation of powers is complex. The
three branches of the federal government are given some
linked as well as some separate powers. For example, the
president has a role in the legislative process, Congress
participates in presidential appointments, and it also
performs judicial functions. Any separation of powers
principle that we could infer from the constitutional text
alone would be incapable of answering the specific question raised by North's challenge to the independent
counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act. If a
separation of powers challenge is to be decided on its
merits, further interpretation of the Constitution would
seem necessary.
If we were to seek out the original intent behind the
constitutional separation of powers, we would not find
evidence of a relevant historical consensus but would be
referred to some prominent framers' sensible expressions of
concern about the importance of preventing dangerous
concentrations of power. Given that, we can address
North's challenge by asking which interpretation of the
Constitution would better serve that justifying rationaleone that allows or one that disallows an independent
counsel.' 4 The obvious answer seems confirmed by experience. A dangerous concentration of power is reduced by
limiting executive branch control over those who are given
the job of investigating possible misconduct in it. North's
preferred arrangement would invite abuse. That gives us
good reason to regard the statutory provision as constitutionally permissible."5

I want now to suggest why constitutional interpretation
should be guided by justifying rationales. A judge's job is
not an intellectual exercise. It is a matter of helping to
decide real controversies involving human beings. What is
typically done by the courts in the name of the law affects
significant human interests most directly. Many of those
who come before the courts do not do so voluntarily. We
cannot assume that they approve of the law that determines their fate or even have a say about it. What is
typically done by courts to people in the name of the law
requires substantive moral justification, which it does not
automatically receive by virtue of its being authorized by
law. 6 Justification requires either that the laws that are
applied be morally defensible, despite regrettable applications, or that there be adequate justification from another
source for applying laws that are themselves unjust.
Here is where the Constitution becomes directly
relevant. Those who try to justify what is done to people in
the name of the law by reference to the Constitution
assume, in effect, not only that respect for the constitutional system requires the decision that is rendered but also
that the virtues of the system as a whole compensate for
moral deficiencies in the laws that are applied and thereby
render morally regrettable judgments morally defensible.
That is typically taken for granted by legal theorists and
officials.
As Dred Scott shows, that assumption can be problematical. When it is, serious problems face those who are
committed to respect for law, especially those serving on
the bench. Perhaps because they can be excruciatingly
painful, those problems are rarely discussed. But they
deserve our most careful and conscientious attention.

David B.Lyons is a professor of law
and the Susan Linn Sage Professor
of Philosophy.
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